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NOTE
INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION: BEYOND
ABSTENTION TOWARD COOPERATIVE
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM *
I. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Since 1938, the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' has served as a
cornerstone for the foundation of federalism. 2  Erie made clear 8 that a
federal court with diversity or pendent jurisdiction 4 over questions of state
law must 5 decide those questions by applying the rules and principles
established by the state courts, not by fashioning "federal general common
law." 6 Federal courts were not to make state law,7 for their jurisdiction
rested on the theory that they were merely alternative forums for the ap-
plication of state law,8 available to potential state litigants only to ensure
evenhanded application of state law and unbiased fact finding.9 This vital
Erie principle has generated the doctrine of abstention.'"
* The title of this Note was adapted from Kurland, Toward a Co-operative
Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.I.D. 481 (1960).
'304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw.
U.L. Rxv. 427, 541 (1958).
3 Under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), a federal
court was bound to accede to state court interpretations of state statutes, but this
was the full content of "rules of decision." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1
Stat. 92. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
615 (1953). See generally id. at 614-21.
4 A federal court has the right to decide all questions in the case, "even though
it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it
omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only."
Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909). A federal court cannot,
however, assume jurisdiction of state questions if they are "separate and distinct"
from the federal question. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933). Although
Erie itself dealt only with diversity jurisdiction, its basic principle-"uniformity of
decision by all courts within the same state-is equally applicable to pendent juris-
diction cases." Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Juris-
diction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. RFv. 1018, 1043 n.142 (1962). See 24
U. CHI. L. REtv. 543 (1957).
5 In Erie, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in dictum that the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which Erie overruled, must be abandoned be-
cause "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear." 304
U.S. at 77-78. This dictum, however, has been widely questioned and never affirmed
in holding by the Supreme Court. See Hill, supra note 2, at 427 n.3, and authorities
therein cited.
6 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
7 See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 271 (1946).
8 See Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 226,
229 n.26 (1959) ; Note, 59 COLuM. L. Rsv. 504 (1959), and cases therein cited.
9 Cf. 304 U.S. at 74: "Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in
order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens
of the State."
20 Cf. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REv. 629, 644-45 (1951).
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In certain cases, a federal court may be unable to determine with
certainty the present content of applicable state law because an authorita-
tive state court has not yet decided the question-involving, for example,
a previously unconstrued state statute-and because that question is difficult
and uncertain. 1 The federal court must then try to predict what the
highest state court would determine, and indeed, the federal district judge,
who is usually a member of the bar of the state in which he sits, is probably
as well-equipped as a state trial judge to forecast state law. But this fore-
cast by a judge not empowered to make state law is not reviewable by any
state court.'2 The doctrine of abstention has been developed, therefore, to
enable a federal court to abstain from deciding such unsettled questions of
state law even though federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked, leav-
ing the litigants to obtain an answer to the question in the state courts.'3
Traditionally, abstention was based on the exercise of equity discre-
tion in two types of cases: in suits brought to enjoin state action because of
federal unconstitutionality, when preliminary state law questions were new
and unclear, the federal court stayed the federal action to enable the state
courts to decide these questions in light of the constitutional objections,14
but retained jurisdiction should a federal adjudication still be necessary; 15
when a federal injunction would result in unwarranted federal-state friction
by disrupting state administrative processes,' 6 the collection of state taxes,
17
or the general execution of local policies,' 8 the federal courts abstained on
the basis of comity and dismissed the suit. In Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux,19 the dimensions of abstention were significantly
altered; no longer was abstention confined to cases in equity, and the easy
categorization of cases as constitutional-therefore-stay or local-disruption-
therefore-dismissal was overturned. In Thibodaux, the district court
stayed state eminent domain proceedings, which had been removed to fed-
eral court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, so that the state judiciary
11 For discussion of the terms "unsettled," "uncertain," and "difficult," see Note,
Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 228 n.19 (1959).
12 Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
13 See generally Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS
L. REV. 815 (1959); Note, supra note 11. A secondary problem which occasioned
abstention was that the absence of state court review of federal determinations of
unsettled questions of state law might encourage the use of the federal courts to
circumvent certain state court interpretations of applicable state law.
14 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959); Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam).
15 See, e.g., City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639
(1959) (per curiam); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The purpose of retention may be not only to decide a remaining constitutional
question, but also to "guard against the possibility of an unforeseen bar to relief
in the state courts," or unreasonable delay, HtaR & WEcHsLER, op. cit. mipra note 3,
at 869 (1953), as well as to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the liti-
gation. See Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 14, at 178-79.
36 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); see Pennsylvania v. Williams,
294 U.S. 176 (1935).
17 Cf. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
18 Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
19 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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could interpret the as yet unconstrued state eminent domain statute20
The Supreme Court upheld the district judge's exercise of discretion in this
case in order to permit an authoritative exposition of an unconstrued state
statute and to prevent possible disparity between the federal version of state
law and that which would be later fashioned in state court. This expan-
sion of the abstention doctrine was a logical extension of the principle
underlying Erie that federal courts must defer to state courts for the
formulation of state law.
II. OBJECTIONS TO ABSTENTION
However, several aspects of the abstention technique seriously un-
dermine its efficacy. When a federal court abstains, the litigants bring a
separate action, often for declaratory judgment, 2 in the appropriate state
court, normally the state court of general jurisdiction. In effect, the case
is transferred from a federal to a state trial court where the state law
question and possibly, in a pendent jurisdiction case, the federal conten-
tion 23 are then presented. To the extent that the federal district judge
and the state trial judge are similarly knowledgeable in state law, the
transfer at that level is largely 24 superfluous. Since the ultimate purpose
of abstention is to secure an authoritative determination of state law, the
litigants must then proceed to the final appellate court through the required
tiers of the state judiciary, unless that court has original jurisdiction over
the particular case. Thus the litigants are subject to the cost and delay
of separate suit in the state court system.2 5 This delay may be magnified
if the propriety of abstention was litigated in the federal system prior to the
separate state action, 6 and is increased when the case returns to the federal
20 City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.
La. 1957). But cf. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959)
(holding district court abstention improper in eminent domain diversity case). Com-
pare Lutes v. United States Dist. Ct., 306 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1962). See Note,
supra note 11, at 240-51.2 1 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29-30
(1959) ; cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Reed, 306 F.2d 481, 487-89 (2d Cir. 1962).
22 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, supra note 21,
at 30-31: "We assume that both parties will cooperate in taking prompt and effective
steps to secure a declaratory judgment under the Louisiana Declaratory Judgment
Act." But see note 25 infra.
23 See cases cited note 14 supra. See also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
24 Except to the extent that the state judge acts knowing that he is subject to
state court review on the question, whereas the federal judge knows he is not.
25 Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1960) ; Note, Judicial Abstention From the
Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 749, 779 & n.195 (1959). It
may be two years and many dollars later before a decision is obtained from the
state's highest court. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25, 43 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (district court should have
abstained on all questions of statutory construction) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (district court decision to abstain affirmed
prior to transfer of case to state court on abstention). The district court's staying
order in an abstention case is not an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1958), City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 255 F.2d 774, 776 (5th
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district court for final adjudication subject to further federal appellate
review
27
If the federal district court abstains before the fact-finding process, the
final state disposition of the state law question will be based on facts
found by the state trial court 2 8 Preferably, however, in order to eliminate
state fact finding, the district court should explicitly retain any factual
question for ultimate federal determination.29  In a pendent jurisdiction
case, if the state's highest court should also decide the federal question,
appeal may be taken directly from that decision to the Supreme Court to
cure unevenhanded application of the state law or improper decision of
the federal question, or both; 30 but the Court's review of state court
fact finding is restricted because of principles of comity and because an
appellate court 3 1 must base any evaluation of trial court findings on a life-
less record3 2 In a pendent jurisdiction case, therefore, abstention may
significantly impair the litigants' right to federal fact finding. In a diversity
case, abstention in the form of district court dismissal may also deprive the
litigant of impartial federal application of state law, since Supreme Court
review of the issues typically posed in a diversity case may, upon equal
protection challenge, only be available through the uncertain process of
certiorari; 3 3 actually, when a serious danger of biased application is ap-
parent, no form of abstention would be proper.3 4
But abstention affects interests other than those of the immediate
litigants. The practice of abstention creates the risk that future litigants
seeking relief under state law might be discouraged from invoking federal
question jurisdiction to vindicate a federal right intertwined with a claim
for state relief, or from utilizing diversity jurisdiction, because of the
anticipation that by suing in the state courts where an appeal might not be
prosecuted they could obtain speedier relief than by suing in a federal court
Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). But the court of appeals
in Thibodaux determined with some difficulty that the district court's stay was an in-
terlocutory order granting an injunction and was therefore appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(1) (1958). The Supreme Court, obviously troubled by this interpretation,
360 U.S. at 26 n.1, eliminated this question from the scope of its review. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 358 U.S. 893 (1958) (granting certiorari).
See also Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1962).
27 See the protracted Spector litigation from Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Mc-
Laughlin, 47 F. Supp. 671 (D. Conn. 1942) to Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951), cited in Note, 59 CoLum L. REv. 749, 779 n.195 (1959).28 When the district court is reversed by the Supreme Court for improperly refus-
ing to abstain, the facts found by the district court pursuant to its initial determina-
tion of the entire case would probably not bind the state court after abstention.
29 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29
(1959) (dictum) (indicating that valuation will be finally determined by district
court).30 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
31 See, e.g., Reid v. Miles Constr. Corp., 307 F.2d 214, 218 (8th Cir. 1962),
citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
32 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum.
L. REv. 157, 172-76 (1953). Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 with U.S. CoNsr.
amend. VII.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958).
34 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda, Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (semble).
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that might abstain and subject them to the cost and delay of separate
journeys through two judicial systems.
3 5
III. INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION
The technique of inter-jurisdictional certification is subject to none of
these objections to abstention. Certification, in general, is a procedural
device that enables a certifying court to secure an answer to a doubtful and
difficult question of law arising in a case before it by presenting the question
and its factual origins to an answering court which either is vested with
a higher or final authority or possesses particular expertise.38 When the
certifying and answering courts are courts of the same state or are both
federal, certification is intra-jurisdictional; the question is certified ver-
tically to obtain an appellate answer. In inter-jurisdictional certification,
the certifying courts are either courts of two different states or the cer-
tifying court is federal and the answering court is state; 3 7 the question is
certified horizontally to settle an uncertain issue of state law. If instead
of abstaining, a federal court can certify the state law question-in its
factual setting and in the context of any constitutional objections--directly
to the state's highest court and under an expedited procedure,33 the litigants
will be saved the time and expense of proceeding through the lower state
court system, subject to trial and appellate court docket delays. Indeed,
Mr. Justice Holmes referred to certification as "a mode of disposing of
cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way." 3 9 In addition,
the question will be framed in terms of facts found by the federal court,
thereby preserving the quality of federal fact finding which the litigant
sought in the alternative federal forum.
35 The cost and delay is further magnified in thirteen states with three-tiered
judiciaries. See 14 CouNcIL OF STATE GoVERNMSNTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
1962-1963, at 123 (1962).36 See Vestal, supra note 10, at 629-32.
37 The phrase "inter-jurisdictional certification" might also describe certification
from a state court to a federal court. Whereas certification from federal to state
court is necessary in order to obtain state court review of a federal decision on
state law in a particular case, state-federal certification is not essential since state
court decision of a federal question may be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.
38 Cf. Speer v. State, 27 Ala. App. 579, 583-84, 177 So. 162, 166 (1937) (little
delay from answer to judgment by certifying court) ; Georgia Power Co. v. Watts,
56 Ga. App. 322, 325, 192 S.E. 493, 496 (1937) (absent motion for rehearing, case
returned ten days after answer) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 96.6(9) (1949) (questions cer-
tified from Iowa Employment Security Commission heard summarily by trial court
in preference to all other civil cases save workmen's compensation) ; TEx. Sup. CT. R.
477 (certified questions immediately sent to Supreme Court consultation room and
either listed for argument or dismissed without hearing if improperly certified).
39 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1909) (dissenting
opinion). Certification is currently endorsed as a potential device for expeditiously
and relatively inexpensively determining uncertain points of state law arising in
cases brought in federal court. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572,
580 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J., concurring); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Am-
sterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 1957) (Finnegan, J., concurring);
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE LJ. 187, 214 (1957) ; Kurland, supra note 25, at 489-90;
Vestal, supra note 10, at 645; Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court,
73 HARv. L. REV. 1358, 1368 (1960).
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Although intra-jurisdictional certification has a long history in both
federal and state courts,40 inter-jurisdictional certification has been used
only once. In 1945, the Florida legislature authorized its supreme court
to establish court rules permitting the United States Supreme Court or
any federal court of appeals to certify unsettled questions of Florida law
determinative of the case in which they arose. 41 The statute lay dormant
40 Congress first authorized federal intra-jurisdictional certification in 1802, by
permitting a circuit court to certify to the Supreme Court any question dividing its
judges. 2 Stat. 159 (1802). In 1891, certification from the newly created circuit
courts of appeals was allowed without requiring a division of opinion. 26 Stat. 828
(1891). But instead of answering the question posed in the certificate, the Supreme
Court could then require the whole record and cause to be sent up for decision as
if on error or appeal. The present statute authorizing certification from the courts
of appeals is essentially the 1891 statute, compare ibid. with 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3)
(1958), except that it permits certification from the Court of Claims, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1255(2) (1958), with no provision, however, for Supreme Court discretion to
decide the whole case prior to Court of Claims decision, because this would involve
an unconstitutional exercise of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Wheeler
Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 576 (1930) (dictum).
Otherwise, a long and steady practice under the regular certification statutes controls
Court of Claims, see id. at 578, as well as court of appeals certification, since cases
concerning the proper elements of a certificate decided under the 1802 statute remain
precedent for post-1891 certification cases. See Graver v. Faurot, 162 U.S. 435, 437
(1896); Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1894). See generally ROBERTSON
& KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 135
(1951) ; Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Ap-
pellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1, 10-19 (1949). The current statute does not
require division of opinion below; but since certification is most effective when used
to obtain initial Supreme Court resolution of a question with no clearly controlling
precedent, the answer probably must still be in doubt before a question is properly
certified. See Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1893); cf.
Webster v. Cooper, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 54 (1850).
Various certification practices exist in seventeen states. See ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 88, 98 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-235 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§59.42 (Supp. 1960) ; FLA. App. R. 4.6; GA. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2-3704; GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 24-4529, -4530 (1959) ; HAwAii REv. LAvs §§ 211-1, -2 (1955) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§§40-1512, -2108, -2220(f) (1952); IowA CODE ANN. § 96.6(9) (1949); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:4449 (1951); LA. SuP. CT. R. 13A; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 211,
§ 6, ch. 214, § 30, ch. 215, § 13 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 632.10 (1947); MINN.
Sup. CT. R. 8; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§490:9, 491:17, 547:30 (1955) ; N.Y. CoNsT.
art. 6, §7(4); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §589; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-24-01 to -04
(1960); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 9-24-26, -27 (1956); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1729 (1945); TEX. SuP. CT. R. 477-79; TEx. CT. Civ. App. R. 461-66; W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 5344, 5769, 5788 (1961) ; W. VA. SuP. CT. App. R. II(4)-(7) ; Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-191 to -193 (1959). Connecticut has a procedure for reserving
questions similar to certification which originally involved only voluntary, informal
consultation. Sargent & Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 65 Conn. 116, 128, 31
Atl. 543, 547 (1894). In 1855, however, a statute formalized the procedure and
made the answer binding on the reserving court. Ibid.; Husted v. Mead, 58 Conn.
55, 66, 19 AtI. 233, 235 (1889). Hawaii's reservation procedure also has a long
history, beginning with Hawaii Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 55, § 72. In 1903, Wyoming
confined its reservation procedure to constitutional questions rather than to difficult
and important questions generally. Compare Wyo. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 72, § 1, with
Wyo. Sess. Laws 1888, ch. 66, § 1.
Despite the long history of intra-jurisdictional certification in the federal and
state courts, it has been little discussed. Vestal, supra note 10, at 629 & n.4. State
intra-jurisdictional certification procedures generally provide that unsettled questions
of law, dispositive of the case in which they arise, accompanied by a statement of
relevant facts, necessary portions of the record, and briefs, may be specifically posed
after lower court decision to the highest court of the state, which commonly has
discretion whether to answer. Its response, once given, is binding on the certifying
court and is usually accorded res judicata effect. Certification is customarily limited
in scope and generally has not been frequently used. See note 76 infra.
41 FL& STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961).
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until Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,4 when Mr. Justice Frankfurter labelled
it a product of "rare foresight" 43 and suggested that it be used. Clay was
a diversity suit on an insurance contract, which plaintiff purchased in
Illinois while an Illinois citizen, to recover for losses sustained in Florida
after plaintiff had moved there. Defendant contended that a contractual
time limitation, valid in Illinois but not in Florida, barred the suit. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment for plaintiff
on the ground that application of the Florida statute to extend the time
limitation was a violation of due process.4 The Supreme Court vacated
this judgment and remanded the cause, holding that the constitutional
issue should have been reached only if necessary after decision of two
nonconstitutional questions of state law: whether the statute was applicable
to the contract in question, and whether the losses sustained were covered
by the policy's "all risks" clause.45 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter indicated that these questions were unsettled and should be
certified inter-jurisdictionally to the Florida Supreme Court for resolution.46
Accordingly, the court of appeals certified the two questions to the Florida
Supreme Court which amended its court rules to implement the certification
statute,4 7 upheld the statute,48 and answered both certified questions in the
affirmative.49
Thus, inter-jurisdictional certification, as illustrated by the Clay case,
not only achieves the objectives of abstention-to prevent federal invasion
of the state law-making function and to avoid needless federal-state fric-
tion-, but also represents a more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial
federalism, since concern for state sovereignty is implemented through a
more efficient and simpler proceeding. In addition, by abstaining, a federal
court temporarily-if it has stayed the action--or permanently-if it has
dismissed the action-severs itself from the case, leaving the state court
to make an independent determination of at least the state law issue.
Judicial cooperation exists only in the sense that a federal court has de-
ferred to a state court. In inter-jurisdictional certification, however, the
federal court actively participates in the resolution of the entire case by
framing the state law question, specifying relevant facts and legal issues.
and certifying directly to the state's highest court.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO CERTIFICATION
However, certification must overcome two basic objections: that it
induces abstract answers by severing legal questions from the facts which
spawned them, and that it elicits advisory opinions from the answering
42 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
43 Id. at 212.
44 Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
45 363 U.S. at 209-10.
4 6 Id. at 212.
4 7 
FLA. App. R. 4.61.
48 Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 739-43 (Fla. 1961).
49 Id. at 743.
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courts. Inter-jurisdictional certification must satisfy both federal and
state justiciability requirements.5 ° The judicial function of an article III
court is restricted to a "case" or "controversy," the antitheses of the ab-
stract or advisory opinion. For a federal court to solicit a state court
answer to an abstractly posed question and subsequently incorporate an
advisory state court answer into its final adjudication of the rights of the
parties would dearly violate the case or controversy principle. It is equally
evident that the justiciable controversy requirements of most states will not
permit a state court answer to an abstractly posed question or an answer
that is merely advisory for state law purposes.51 The constitutional prob-
lem which might be raised by federal solicitation and incorporation of
abstract answers and the reluctance of the state court to answer an abstract
certification can be obviated by an appropriate set of certification rules.6
2
A. Abstractness
An abstract question is defective because it is not stated in terms of
concrete facts rooted in past acts.5 3  A question without a specific focus
tends to induce a generalized answer which often disregards hard and
precise issues; without actual facts as guidelines, an answering court must
try to prevision a near-infinity of possible fact complexes in order to
formulate an accommodating rule. To avoid abstractness, therefore, the
certifying federal court must pose the question in its detailed factual set-
ting; 4 indeed, findings of fact should be an indispensable part of the
50 For discussion of state justiciability requirements, see 40 TExAs L. REv. 1041,
1044 (1962).
53 But cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845
(1961), 40 TExAs L. REv. 1041 (1962).
52 See Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REv. 629, 646 (1951).
The problem of abstractness has been exaggerated far beyond its severity. Note, 16
U. MIAmi L. Rav. 413, 431 (1962) ; Comment, 21 LA. L. Rav. 777, 781-83 (1961).
53 See HART & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
77-79 (1953).
54 State intra-jurisdictional procedures are practically unanimous in their quest
to eliminate abstractness. Only Alabama permits a certified question to be presented
as an abstract proposition, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 88 (1959), but questions are
particularized by the record and briefs in the case. See Bolin v. State, 266 Ala.
256, 96 So. 2d 582 (1957); Sanders v. State, 260 Ala. 323, 70 So. 2d 802 (1954).
Connecticut courts, influenced by the federal certification rules, have sought to avoid
academic questions. See Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 147 Conn. 221, 223, 158 A.2d
740, 741 (1960); Hart v. Roberts, 80 Conn. 71, 74-75, 66 At. 1026, 1027 (1907).
In Florida, the questions must be "definitely and concisely stated," and the certificate
must contain a "style of the case" and a statement of facts. FLA. AP,. R. 4.6.
Georgia court rules were adopted verbatim from the federal certification rules, see
Johnston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 229, 188 S.E. 27 (1936), and thus seek to
prevent abstract questions. The Supreme Court of Hawaii will not answer moot or
abstract questions. Territory v. Aldridge, 35 Hawaii 565 (1940) ; E. E. Black, Ltd.
v. Conkling, 33 Hawaii 278 (1935): see Cabrinha v. American Factors, Ltd., 42
Hawaii 96 (1957). Certified questions must be concrete. Sherman v. McClellan,
24 Hawaii 428 (1918) ; see In the Matter of Sherwood, 22 Hawaii 385, 389 (1914).
The Louisiana Court of Appeals may certify "clear and concise" questions, LA. REv.
STAT. § 13:4449 (1951), accompanied by findings of fact on which the questions are
"predicated," LA. SuP. CT. R. 13(4). Questions may be reserved from trial courts
in New Hampshire upon agreed statements of fact. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 491-17
(1955). See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490:9 (1955). But the facts need not
be specifically stated if they can be found in the record. See Record v. Rochester
1963]
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certificate.35 In addition, as much of the record as is necessary for a com-
plete understanding of the question should be included.56 This selectivity
of the facts and portions of the record to be contained in the certificate
contributes to the expeditious nature of the certification technique.
57
Occasionally a case may be too complex to be so divided that a ques-
tion of law together with its surrounding facts and legal issues can stand
alone as a judicially cognizable unit.5 8  In such an indivisible case, rather
than certifying a question that would necessarily be hypothetical because
not presented in a context of related and necessary facts and issues of law,
the federal court should send to the state court all legal questions, all find-
ings of fact, and the entire record in order to guarantee a concrete setting
of interrelated issues.5 9
The case or controversy principle also requires a genuinely adversary
presentation of relevant issues in actual dispute,60 on the theory that the
clash of somewhat extreme positions will facilitate an objective solution
through mutual correction. Thus, to prevent abstractness the question
should be briefed and argued before the answering court."'
Basically, these proposed inter-jurisdictional rules would parallel
the technical requirements which have been rigidly enforced by the Su-
Trust Co., 89 N.H. 1, 10, 192 At. 177, 183 (1937). When certification existed in New
Jersey, questions had to be framed by concrete cases. Schreiner v. Grinnell, 89 N.J.L.
37, 97 Atl. 781 (Sup. Ct. 1916). The New York Court of Appeals will never answer an
academic question. Jackson v. National Grange Mut. Liab. Co., 299 N.Y. 333, 87
N.E.2d 283 (1949). Only nonabstract questions can be certified in Texas. Galveston,
H. & S.A. Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 S.W. 563 (1898); see Gillespie v.
Fuller Constr. Co., 122 Tex. 506, 61 S.W.2d 977 (1933).
55 Cf. Cutler's Appeal, 74 Conn. 35, 36, 49 Atl. 338 (1901); LA. SuP. Cr. R.
13(4).
56 Cf. Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So. 2d 582 (1957) ; Sanders v. State, 260
Ala. 323, 70 So. 2d 802 (1954) ; FLA. APP. R. 4.6; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4529 (1959) ;
Hodges v. Seabord Loan & Say. Ass'n, 188 Ga. 410, 412, 3 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1939)
(dictum); LA. tav. STAT. § 13:4449 (1951); MINN. Sup. CT. R. 8; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-24-03 (1960); Tax. CT. Civ. App. R. 466; W. VA. CODE ch. 58, art. 5,
§2 (1962).
57 Clearly, only uncertain questions should be certified in order to ensure that
inter-jurisdictional certification is utilized only when necessary, thereby preserving its
expeditious nature; cf. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 88 (1959) (there must be a division
of opinion of the judges of the court of appeals) ; FLA. Apr. R. 4.6(a) ; Chapman v.
Slaff, 101 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam); Territory v. Scully,
22 Hawaii 484 (1915) (lower court must have "well-founded doubts" about the
answer) ; Phillips v. Soule, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 150 (1863) (grave or doubtful ques-
tions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-24-04 (1960); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-24-01
(1960). The answer probably must be doubtful to justify federal intra-jurisdictional
certification. See note 40 supra.
58 Cf. FLA. App. R. 4.6. (intra-jurisdictional questions must be answerable "with-
out regard to other issues" in the case).
59 See note 56 supra.
6o Cf. HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 77.
61 Cf. Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So. 2d 582 (1957) ; Sanders v. State, 260
Ala. 323, 70 So. 2d 802 (1954) (briefs); FA. APP. R. 4.6 (briefs and oral argu-
ment) ; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 193 Ga. 437, 18 S.E.2d 681
(1942) (briefs) ; Territory v. Uluihi, 28 Hawaii 156 (1925) (per curiam) (briefs) ;
Opinion to Governor, 88 R.I. 392, 149 A.2d 341 (1959) (by implication) (briefs and
oral argument); TEx. CT. Crv. APP. R. 466; Tax. Sup. CT. R. 477; White v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484 (1957) (by implication) (oral
argument).
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preme Court to prevent federal intra-jurisdictional certification of abstract
questions.62 The federal intra-jurisdictional certificate must state its
questions dearly and distinctly 6 so that the Court need not labor to find
a definite question."5 Each insulated legal question must be presented in
a particularized factual setting,65 and the certificate must disclose all per-
tinent facts so that the questions are not affected by "unstated matter
lurking in the record." 66 Questions of "objectionable generality" are dis-
missed. 67  Further, a certificate is defective if the question as posed can
consistently receive different answers.6 8 To secure the important adversary
context of the actual case, the certified questions are briefed and argued.69
Although these technical requirements were essential to guard against
abstractness in order to enforce the federal constitutional case or controversy
requirement, the Supreme Court has properly applied them far more
62The Supreme Court will answer an intra-jurisdictional certificate only when
satisfied that it presents an actual issue in the case involving a federal question suffi-
ciently substantial to justify Court review on appeal. See United States v. Rice,
327 U.S. 742 (1946); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942);
Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572 (1930); News
Syndicate Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 275 U.S. 179 (1927); United States v.
Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914); McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651 (1898); United
States v. Hall, 131 U.S. 50 (1889); United States v. Northway, 120 U.S.
327 (1887); United States v. Briggs, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 208 (1847). See also
HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 571-76 (1953).
6
3 McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 659 (1898); United States v. Briggs,
supra note 62.
64United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 168 U.S. 505, 512 (1897) ; United States v.
Perrin, 131 U.S. 55, 57 (1889); United States v. Hall, 131 U.S. 50, 52 (1889);
Dublin Township v. Milford Say. Institution, 128 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1888).
65 NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 27 (1941).
66 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 573 (1939).
67 NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 27 (1941).
68 See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 573 (1939);
Lowden v. Northwestern Natl Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 162 (1936);
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 648 (1936).
69 See Sup. CT. R. 29.
Moreover, due to the appellate nature of certification, the questions must neces-
sarily be purely legal and not factual, Jewell v. Knight, 123 U.S. 426, 434 (1887);
City of Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U.S. 699, 701 (1886) ; Sup. CT. R. 28(1), or a
mixture of law and fact, Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Williams, 205 U.S. 444, 453 (1907).
And the factual statement accompanying the certified question must contain ultimate
facts only, leaving just a conclusion of law to be drawn. See Jewell v. Knight,
supra at 434. The Court bases its answer on the facts found in the certificate. See
Sup. CT. R. 29(1). It neither infers further facts, weighs the evidence, see Fire Ins.
Ass'n v. Wickham, 128 U.S. 426, 434 (1888), nor uses the record unless it has
called up the whole case. See Cincinnati, H. & D.R.R. v. McKeen, 149 U.S. 259,
261 (1893). If the question involves an issue that may not ultimately require de-
cision in order to dispose of the case, the Court will not risk answering an academic
question. See Busby v. Electric Util. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1944). On the
other hand, because a case turns on the question certified does not mean that the
whole case has been certified; thus, a question is not disallowed because its answer
may decide the controversy. Indeed, the importance or controlling character of the
question is the best reason for its certification, Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Williams,
214 U.S. 492, 496 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and its answer must always
aid in the lower court's determination of the case. United States v. Mayer, 235
U.S. 55, 66 (1914). Although more than one point may be certified, the questions
must not add up to the whole case. See United States v. Hall, 131 U.S. 50, 52
(1889). Under the present statute, transfer of the entire case to the Supreme Court
can occur only on the Court's own initiative. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1958); Sup.
CT. R. 28(2).
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strictly 70 than the Constitution demands for two reasons: to provide a
framework for practical operation within the general phraseology of the
federal intra-jurisdictional certification statute; 71 and to maintain control
over its docket by limiting the number of questions that the courts of ap-
peals or Court of Claims could present within the Court's obligatory cer-
tification jurisdiction 7 2L-as opposed to the discretionary certiorari pro-
cedure-, 73 since the Court would otherwise be able to refuse these cer-
tificates only for want of a substantial federal question.74 Therefore, the
Supreme Court's underlying attitude of answering only when absolutely
necessary 7 5 should not be transplanted into the inter-jurisdictional con-
text as precedent for either the certifying federal court or the answering
state court to narrow the scope of certification. Nor should the state
court's willingness to answer be affected by any reluctance it may have
evidenced to respond to intra-jurisdictional state certificates. 76 For in
intra-jurisdictional certification, the answering court is an appellate court
with revisory and supervisory powers over the certifying court; in order
to ensure a correct decision it can review the entire case after it is finally
determined below. Because of the answering court's ultimate dominion
70 See note 62 supra.
7128 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1958) : "By certification at any time by a court of ap-
peals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions
are desired ... "
72 Ibid.
-3 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1958).
74 See note 62 supra.
75 Since intra-jurisdictional certification invokes an exceptional aspect, Wisniewski
v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curiam), of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 747 (1946), it has been
sparingly used. Before 1950, there were approximately two certification cases per
year, Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appel-
late Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1, 10-19 (1949); since then probably fewer have
arisen. See note 62 supra.
76 See Stark v. Malcom, 38 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1949); Schwob Co. v.
Florida Industrial Comm'n, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So. 2d 782 (1942) (dictum); McGuckin
v. Dade County, 121 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (per curiam) ; In re
Aron's Estate, 118 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (dictum); Clar v. Dade
County, 116 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (dictum); Davies v. Davies, 113
So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (dictum) (scope of certification strictly con-
strued). Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Hawaii 142 (1916) (used con-
servatively to avoid piecemeal trials). The Wyoming Supreme Court, although
originally supporting reservation because it saved time and expense, State v. Crocker,
5 Wyo. 385, 40 Pac. 681 (1895), has now condemned it as a hindrance to speedy
disposition. White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 256, 313 P.2d 484,
488 (1957).
However, several states have liberally employed certification. The Alabama Su-
preme Court readily answers. See Johnson v. State, 269 Ala. 1, 111 So. 2d 610
(1958); Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So. 2d 582 (1957); Smith v. State, 263
Ala. 1, 82 So. 2d 296 (1955) ; Sanders -v. State, 260 Ala. 323, 70 So. 2d 802 (1954).
A substantial number of reported certification cases indicates that Minnesota's pro-
cedure, which is limited to criminal cases, Newton v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 186 Minn.
437, 240 N.W. 470 (1932) (per curiam) ; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 632.10 (1947),
is often used. In New Hampshire, certification is also commonly employed and
even considered "well adapted to effectuate the speedy and final determination of
the validity of legislation." Musgrove v. Parker, 84 N.H. 550, 551, 153 Atl. 320, 321
(1931) (dictum). The Wyoming Supreme Court recently answered eleven related
certified questions in one case. Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502,
337 P.2d 262 (1959).
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over the case, certification provides merely a preliminary contact with the
cause, and an intra-jurisdictional answering court can decline to answer
without serious misgivings. In inter-jurisdictional certification, however,
the answering court has no control over the certifying court other than
its power to answer the certified questions; certification is usually the only
decisional channel through which the answering court will have direct
contact with the case. Thus, the inter-jurisdictional answering court should
more readily respond to the question posed by the federal certificate, re-
gardless of its own or federal intra-jurisdictional precedents.
77
B. Advisory Opinion
Although abstractness can be eliminated by an appropriately framed
certificate and by an adversary presentation of the case, if resolution of the
certified question is not necessary to the disposition of the case, the answer
is merely advisory. An advisory answer lacks the responsiveness and
responsibility to particular litigants that inheres in an answer which, being
essential to the disposition of a case, directly affects the parties' rights.
78
An answer that binds the specific parties and is res judicata as to their state
rights should also be accorded stare decisis effect in all future indistinguish-
able cases so that decisional rules of law will be applied evenhandedly. The
sobering fact that a decision determines both present and future rights
ensures more responsible examination of issues and more scrupulous balanc-
ing of competing considerations. Therefore, to maximize the probability
of correct answers, inter-jurisdictional certification should be restricted to
questions necessary to disposition of the case.
79
In intra-jurisdictional certification, many states require a lower court
ruling before the question can be certified to the state's highest court8 0
77 Florida, the inter-jurisdictional pioneer, has been restrictive in its intra-
jurisdictional practice. See Florida cases cited note 76 mtpra.
78 HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 78-79.
79 Cf. Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 147 Conn. 221, 158 A.2d 740 (1960) ; Hart v.
Roberts, 80 Conn. 71, 74, 66 At. 1026, 1027 (1907) ("quite certain" to enter into
disposition of the case); FLA. App. R. 4.6(a) ; Chapman v. Slaff, 101 So. 2d 413
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam) (determinative) ; GA. CoDE ANN. § 24-4530
(1959) ; Queen v. Poor, 9 Hawaii 218, 220 (1893) (probably "decisive of the case') ;
Phillips v. Soule, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 150 (1863) ("expedient or necessary for the
final disposition"); Fortin v. Sullivan, 96 N.H. 320, 321, 75 A.2d 785, 786 (1950)
(per curiam) (would be "of no assistance" to the lower court); N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
AcT § 589; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cohen, 300 N.Y. 361, 91 N.E.2d 57
1950); Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 296 N.Y. 60, 70 N.E.2d 15 (1946)
per curiam) ("decisive of the correctness of the order appealed from") ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-24-04 (1960) ("principally determinative of the issues in the case") ; Poirier
v. Quinn, 83 R.I. 98, 113 A.2d 642 (1955) ("so affects the merits" that immediate
decision is needed); Kelley-Goodfellow Shoe Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co., 87 Tex. 112,
26 S.W. 1063 (1894) ("essential to the decision"); State v. Houchins, 96 W. Va.
375, 377, 123 S.E. 185, 186 (1924) (dictum) (of "vital importance . . . [to] final
disposition").
80 See HAwAII REV. LAws § 211-2 (1955) (question may be returned for initial
decision below); State v. Wellman, 143 Minn. 488, 173 N.W. 574 (1919) (per
curiam) ; State v. Byrud, 23 Minn. 29 (1876) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-24-04 (1960) ;
TEX. CT. Civ. App. R. 466 (tentative decision below); W. VA. Sup. CT. App. R.
11(4) ; County Court v. Cottle, 82 XV. Va. 743, 97 S.E. 292 (1918) ; State v. Houchins,
96 W. Va. 375, 123 S.E. 185 (1924) (dictum). But cf. Manchester Amusement Co.
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This not only reveals whether or not the answer sought will enter into the
final disposition of the case, but also ensures that the prerequisites to the
proper invocation of the state court's appellate jurisdiction will be satisfied.
1. Satisfying State Justiciability Requirements
Before it can answer a certified question, a state appellate court must
be convinced that its state justiciability requirements will not be offended.
Although certain states might permit a purely advisory answer,81 the
majority of states would probably respond only if their answer would be
sufficiently nonadvisory to qualify as a res judicata and stare decisis ad-
judication of the state rights involved. -8 2  Clearly, then, decision on certifica-
tion is basically dissimilar to the normal advisory opinions rendered to a
legislature, governor, or state council by courts in eleven states in response
to questions of law that neither arise from actual litigation nor involve
private rights.8 3 These consultatory opinions are not legally binding al-
though they are invariably accepted by the requesting governmental unit
and are frequently cited as authority in later cases.8 4  In some states, they
are not institutional determinations; 85 they are, in fact, sparingly ren-
dered.8 6 Although briefs may be submitted, there is usually no oral
v. Conn., 80 N.H. 455, 461, 119 AtI. 69, 73 (1922) ; N.H. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FOURTH
REPORT 32-34 (1952) (important questions may be reserved prior to trial court
ruling) ; Stutsman County v. Dakota Trust Co., 45 N.D. 451, 178 N.W. 725 (1920).
Spaulding v. Martin, 66 R.I. 367, 19 A.2d 305 (1941) (permitted prior to trial);
Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933) (appellate function limits
supreme court to deciding questions only after decision below); State v. Crocker,
5 Wyo. 385, 40 Pac. 681 (1895) (state constitution does not require decision below).
But see White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 77 Wyo. 246, 313 P.2d 484 (1957);
State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954)
(questions of statutory construction must be first determined by Wyoming trial
court).
81 Eleven states permit advisory opinions of some sort. See note 83 infra and
accompanying text.
82 Most state intra-jurisdictional procedures accord some sort of binding effect
to the answer. See ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 88 (1958) ; Lashley v. State, 28 Ala.
App. 86, 90, 180 So. 720, 723 (1938) (most probably res judicata and stare decisis) ;
Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 393, 414-15 (1877) ; New Haven & Northampton
Co. v. State, 44 Conn. 376, 391-92 (1877) (res judicata just as though originally
rendered by reserving court and affirmed by the answering court) ; Nichols v. City
of Bridgeport, 27 Corn. 459, 462 (1858) (dictum) (res judicata effect but precedential
value unclear). But see Sargent & Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 65 Conn. 116,
127-28, 31 At. 543, 547 (1894). See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Stuart,
191 Ga. 745, 14 S.E.2d 98 (1941) (binding on certifying court insofar as applicable) ;
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4449 (1951) (binding on certifying court) ; Pipes v. Gall-
man, 174 La. 257, 140 So. 40 (1932) (res judicata on review unless additional facts
appear that were not stated on certification) ; Stutsman County v. Dakota Trust Co.,
45 N.D. 451, 178 N.W. 725 (1920) (res judicata); Opinion to Governor, 88 R.I. 392,
149 A.2d 341 (1959) (suggesting that decision on certification has the force of law) ;
cf. Rosenbledt v. Wodehouse, 25 Hawaii 561 (1920) (answer not binding on supreme
court when reviewing entire case on writ of error). See also Vestal, supra note 52,
at 636.
83 The usual advisory opinion is described in Stevens, Advisory Opinions-
Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1959).
84 HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 80-81; Stevens, supra note 83,
at 6-7.
85 See Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203, 214 (1949).
86 Stevens, supra note 83, at 11.
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argument 8 7 In inter-jurisdictional certification, however, the answer is
responsive to a question which was presented in actual litigation and
presumably was posed nonabstractly by a federal court bound to solicit an
answer in accordance with a standard at least as stringent as the state's
own justiciability requirement. Most significantly, that answer will deter-
mine the rights of federal court parties, will have res judicata and stare
decisis effect, and will authoritatively settle state law on the question.
Therefore, when a federal court has chosen to defer to the state court and
has initiated a chain of cooperation by certifying the state law question, the
state court should normally not hesitate to answer in order to make coopera-
tive federalism a practical reality.
2. Satisfying the Federal Constitutional Requirement
The ultimate step in inter-jurisdictional certification is the incorpora-
tion of the state answer by the federal certifying court into its final deter-
mination of the parties' rights. If the state answer is presented as an
advisory opinion-without res judicata or stare decisis effect-by a state
court empowered to issue such decisions, its federal incorporation would
raise serious constitutional objections, since federal litigants' rights would
then effectively be decided by a state tribunal unrestrained by the respon-
sibility of formulating precedential state law. In any event, since an
advisory opinion is somewhat unresponsive to the actual litigants and ir-
responsible to similar future litigants if it has no res judicata or stare decisis
effect, the federal court should probably reject an advisory answer as an
unreliable exposition of state law, and either recertify the question, request-
ing a binding precedential determination, or decide the state law question
itself. However, should the state court answer be a final adjudication of
the federal litigants' state rights to be accorded stare decisis effect by the
state judiciary, incorporation by the federal court would not violate the
federal case or controversy requirement, just as incorporation of a binding
state court opinion secured after federal court abstention is evidently con-
sonant with the federal requirement.88
V. IMPLEMENTING INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION
A. Solely Federal Authorization
Several alternative patterns of authorization are conceivable to imple-
ment inter-jurisdictional certification. A federal statute 8 9 might be enacted
enabling federal court litigants in an abstention situation to petition for
issuance to the appropriate state court of a certificate requesting an answer
to an unsettled question of state law. It is unlikely, however, that Congress
could compel state answer, especially if the state court objected on the
87 Field, sipra note 85, at 214.
88 But cf. 40 TEXAs L. REv. 1041 (1962).
89 See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doc-
trine it Diversity Cases, 67 YALE LJ. 187, 214 (1957). Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947). See generally HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 395-99.
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ground that it was not otherwise competent 9 o since it had no intrastate
certification procedure. Congress could perhaps compel a state with intra-
jurisdictional certification to answer on the theory that it is "necessary and
proper for carrying into execution" the federal judicial power,91 but such
compulsion is hardly conducive to cooperative judicial federalism which
certification should foster.
Certification might also be implemented through federal court initiative
alone. It has been suggested that a federal equity court has inherent power
to certify to state courts,92 although it is doubtful that it can compel an
answer. Nevertheless, a state's willingness to answer might be evidenced
by its response in a somewhat analogous situation. Cases on review in the
Supreme Court in which the basis of state court decision below was suffi-
ciently ambiguous to render uncertain the existence of an adequate and
independent nonfederal ground have been retained in the Court pending
application to the state court for a certificate to remove the ambiguity; 
9 3
state courts have usually responded by clarifying or amending their original
opinion. Of course, this procedure to clarify the basis of a state court's
decision in a case which originated in that state court, is distinguishable
from inter-jurisdictional certification which involves the transfer of a dis-
crete part of a case originally brought in federal court to a state court which
has no past contact with the case. Thus it is difficult to predict the states'
reaction to inter-jurisdictional questions certified under inherent federal
equity power.
B. The Need for State Authorization
Since inter-jurisdictional certification is an expeditious and efficient
procedure designed to accelerate cooperation between federal and state
judiciaries, it ideally should be implemented by coordinate action, without
any need for federal compulsion of state answer.94 The answering state
court should function under statutory authorization or court rules, or both,
intended to facilitate and promote the reception of federal court certificates.
In addition, the federal courts should be provided with a clarifying federal
statute and should promulgate detailed court rules which complement ap-"
propriate state requirements for certification. Yet the Clay case demon-
strates that state authorization alone-by statute and court rule-is suffi-
cient to implement inter-jurisdictional certification, and that the Supreme
Court has recognized the value of certification to the federal judiciary and
has authorized its use by the courts of appeals when appropriate state pro-
90 Cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
92 Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358,
1368 (1960).
93 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). See generally HART & WEcHSLER,
op. cit. supra note 53, at 443-47; Wolfson & Kurland, Certificates by State Courts
of the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HARv. L. Rxv. 111 (1949); Note, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1962).
94 See Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalisin: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 (1960).
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cedures exist.95 The onus of implementation, therefore, whether through
statute or court rule, or both, now rests upon the states, although federal
initiative in authorizing inter-jurisdictional certification might accelerate
state adoption. Theoretically, sufficient incentive for state implementation
should be provided by the fact that respect for state sovereignty is the
underlying concern of inter-jurisdictional certification.
C. Discretion in the Federal Certifying Court
In situations in which federal courts would otherwise abstain, the
objectives of certification will be better served by discretionary, rather than
mandatory, certification procedures. For example, in certain pendent
jurisdiction cases so complex that in order to avoid abstractness the certify-
ing court must include all the questions in the case, certification may be
inappropriate because inclusion of the federal question may constitute an
abdication of the federal judicial function. However, by virtue of the
ultimate federal dominion over the cause, this objection may be minimized
in specific instances. The federal court may be able to forestall state
court decision of the federal issue by instructing the state court to con-
sider the federal question only as providing a context for decision of the
state question.98 Or should the state court proceed to determine the
federal question, the federal court could either disregard the state answer
and adopt only the state law determination, or reject the entire answer
upon finding that the state court decision of the state issue was so re-
lated to an incorrect federal question decision that it no longer represented
a valid exposition of state law. In the highly unlikely 97 event that appeal
of the state court decision could be taken directly to the Supreme Court,
98
the absence of lower federal court determination of the federal question
would not prejudice the litigants since they would then receive the most
authoritative adjudication of their federal rights.
In a diversity case, even though a federal court instruction might not
be able to prevent or persuade a state court from deciding all state law
questions, certification of all the issues would not constitute an abdication
since diversity jurisdiction is intended to create only an alternative forum
to ensure evenhanded application of state law and unbiased fact finding-by
definition not involved in certification since the certificate establishes the
factual situation-, rather than to provide a means of avoiding state court
interpretation of state law. And, in the event of biased state application,
the federal court could always re-apply the state law as the state court has
95 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1960).
96 Cf. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 (1957) (per curiam).
9 7 Access to Supreme Court review through appeal or certiorari would depend
on whether state answers constitute "final judgments or decrees" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958). Cf. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm.
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam). See generally, HART & WECHSLER,
op. cit. supra note 53, at 545-57.
98 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1958).
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articulated it, or, if necessary, reject the entire state court answer and
decide the whole case itself. In light of these possibilities, the federal
certifying court must clearly be given discretion to determine the appro-
priateness of certification 9 9 by evaluating the subtle and essentially unpre-
dictable factors in each particular case.'00
D. Discretion in the State Answering Court
Nor should certification invoke the obligatory jurisdiction of the state
answering court.' 0 ' After it has requested and examined the full record,
that court may be unable to answer because the question as posed is
hypothetical under state justiciability requirements. Even if the certificate
satisfies these state requirements, the record may indicate that the ques-
tion is one which the state court for various reasons is not yet prepared to
answer 102 or which would entail only discretionary review if appealed in
the state court system; merely because the state court now receives the
question in the form of a federal court certificate does not justify invasion
of basic state court prerogative. Indeed, a state provision for compulsory
answer would not comport with the cooperative aspect of cooperative
judicial federalism. Therefore, inter-jurisdictional certification should be
entrusted to the sound discretion of both the federal certifying court and
the state answering court.
E. Federal District Court Certification
Although abstention occurs at the district court level, it does not
necessarily follow that the federal district courts should be able to initiate
inter-jurisdictional certification. Some states' intra-jurisdictional pro-
cedures foreclose certification from trial courts or require a prior trial court
ruling on the question to avoid an unconstitutional exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by the state's highest court,1 3 to ensure that the question is
actually essential to determination of the case, and to aid the certifying court
in drafting a nonabstract certificate. 04 If the district court certification is
99 Cf. Vestal, supra note 52, at 633.
100 Cf. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 88 (1958); FLA. APP. R. 4.6; Queen v. Poor,
9 Hawaii 218, 220 (1893) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 96.6(9) (1949) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:4449 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-24-04 (1960). But cf. ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 98 (1958) ; State v. Homan, 38 Ala. App. 642, 645, 92 So. 2d 51, 53 (1957)
(dictum) (certification required if court of appeals intends to invalidate statute).
101 Cf. Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 147 Conn. 221, 223, 158 A.2d 740, 741 (1960);
Hart v. Roberts, 80 Conn. 71, 75, 66 At. 1026, 1027 (1907) (in the interest of "sim-
plicity, directness and economy of judicial action"); Queen v. Poor, 9 Hawaii 218,
220 (1893); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4449 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-24-02
(1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5788 (1961). But cf. Johnston v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
183 Ga. 229, 232, 188 S.E. 27, 28 (1936) (supreme court must answer if certificate
accords with technical court rules). Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role
of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1, 43 (1949).
102 The question may not be "ripe," see Vestal, Slpra note 52, at 635, or it
may be a political "hot potato" that the court does not wish to pick up.
103 See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
104E.g., Stutsman County v. Dakota Trust Co., 45 N.D. 451, 178 N.W. 725
(1920).
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to be accepted by those states permitting trial court certification, therefore,
it should at least be limited to questions first decided by the district courts.
But the basic reasons for the abstention doctrine as now developed do not
require certification at this level. Abstention is intended in part to prevent
federal decision of unsettled state law when there is no opportunity for state
court review. Since a district court judge is usually a member of the bar
of the state in which he sits and presumably possesses an adequate knowl-
edge of that state's law, he is as able as a state trial court judge to make a
calculated guess as to the probable state supreme court decision of the
unsettled question. And, with certification by the court of appeals a
possibility, the district court judge, like his state counterpart, would be
operating under the knowledge that his decision on state law might be
subject to review by the highest state court. Consequently, any added
delay at this level, even through the expeditious certification technique,
imposes an unnecessary burden on the litigants.
In addition, limiting certification to the courts of appeals removes the
risk-inherent in abstention and involved to a lesser degree should district
courts be permitted to certify-that prospective litigants with state claims
might be discouraged from invoking federal question or diversity jurisdic-
tion because they believed that they could obtain speedier relief in state
court. Furthermore, if certification is permitted only after a case has been
appealed, the more regionally composed court of appeals, less conversant
with a particular state's law, can use the district court opinion to determine
more accurately whether the state law question is so unsettled that certifi-
cation is required; to make certain that the question is necessary to dis-
position of the case; and to assist the formulation of a nonabstract certificate
which takes interrelated issues into consideration. Also, certification only
from courts of appeals eliminates the delay involved in abstention when the
case must first return to the district court. Finally, although a state may be
willing to expand its judicial workload to encompass certified questions
from federal appellate courts, it may consider certification from the numer-
ous federal district courts an unnecessary burden should certification be-
come an accepted technique. Thus, the Florida statute and court rule
relied on in the Clay case effectively limit the number of cases that may be
certified to the Florida Supreme Court by providing for only court of
appeals and Supreme Court certification. 05
F. Three-Judge District Court Certification
Use of the inter-jurisdictional certification technique by three-judge
district courts has also been suggested.10 6 Unlike the regular district courts,
the three-judge tribunals include one court of appeals judge and one district
105 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) ; FLA. APP. R. 4.61.
10 6 Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 n.44 (1960).
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judge who may not normally sit in the state whose law is to be applied;
accordingly, state decision of an unsettled state law question seems more
appropriate at the three-judge level. Moreover, since three-judge courts
have jurisdiction over suits brought to enjoin enforcement of state stat-
utes,'10 7 they have a particular interest in obtaining a definitive resolution
of unsettled questions of state law; and since their jurisdiction is limited,
they are not so often convened that they could certify a burdensome number
of questions. Indeed, leading abstention cases involving pendent jurisdic-
tion have originated in three-judge district courts. 08 However, to conform
to the appellate requirements of some states, to clarify the dispositive nature
of the question, and perhaps to aid in drafting a nonabstract certificate,
certification should be limited to those state questions already decided by
the three-judge court. Most decisively, three-judge district court certifi-
cation is necessary since there will be no opportunity in the case for a court
of appeals to certify-three-judge determinations are only appealable to the
Supreme Court; 109 and although the Supreme Court could certify, the
process of determining whether to certify and framing the certificate in all
such three-judge abstention cases imposes an unwarranted burden on the
Supreme Court in light of the reasonable alternative of permitting certifica-
tion directly from the three-judge courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inter-jurisdictional certification from courts of appeals and three-
judge district courts will better attain the objectives of abstention while
curing its defects. Therefore, abstention should not be available to district
courts in those states that adopt appropriate procedures for the reception
and nonadvisory answer of federally certified questions. However, the
scope of certification probably should not be governed by the extremely hazy
standard that determines when abstention is appropriate or acceptable.
Accordingly, although inter-jurisdictional certification is proposed to replace
federal court abstention, it may ultimately be broadly applicable to diver-
sity 0 and pendent jurisdiction cases in which pertinent state law is un-
settled because either no decisions are on point or the decisions are in
conflict. Such certification would further the Erie principle that federal
courts should not make state law,"' and that state law applied in federal
court should not differ from state-court state law, while preserving for the
10728 U.S.C. §2281 (1958).
108 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) ; Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
109 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
110 Although federal courts may abstain in certain diversity cases, Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), cannot be so broadly
construed as to authorize abstention in all diversity cases in which state law is
unclear. See Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
226, 247 (1959).
111 See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957).
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litigant his right to federal fact finding. Inter-jurisdictional certification
may even be extended to the conflict of laws area to enable a state court to
certify an unsettled question of another state's law to the highest court of
that other state.' 2
VII. PROPOSED MODEL STATE STATUTE
A model state statute or rule of court incorporating this Note's con-
clusions and modifying the pioneering Florida statute would read as follows:
SECTION 1. When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of
the United States, any Court of Appeals of the United States, or
any three-judge District Court of the United States that in the
case before it an unsettled question of this State's law
(1) is necessary to disposition of the case; and
(2) (a) is so insulated that it can be answered without
regard to other issues of law and fact in the case, or
(b) is unseverable but the intertwined questions of law
and findings of fact may be appropriately included in
the certificate;
in the interest of expeditious and authoritative determination, this
question may be certified to the Supreme Court of this State,
which may in its discretion answer a question so certified; pro-
vided that a question certified from a three-judge District Court
of the United States shall have first been decided by that Court.
SECTION 2. The certificate shall contain, in addition to the
certified question, the ultimate findings of fact which gave rise to
the question and parts of the record relevant thereto. However,
the entire record may be included at the discretion of the federal
certifying Court; or it shall be forwarded upon request to the
Supreme Court of this State.
SECTION 3. Whenever possible, hearing on certified ques-
tions shall be expedited on the docket of the Supreme Court of
this State.
SECTION 4. Briefs and oral argument shall be required on
the question in the same manner as in all other cases in the
Supreme Court of this State.
SECTION 5. The answer to the certified question shall be
accorded the same determinative and precedential force as any
other appellate decision of the Supreme Court of this State.
Gerald M. Levin
112 See Vestal, supra note 52, at 643-44.
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